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ON THE DEPTH OF GO¨DEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM
YONG CHENG
Abstract. Is Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem deep? For us, the answer of
this question depends on our view of mathematical depth. This paper is moti-
vated by the following question: if Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is consid-
ered as deep, what its depth consists in? For us, an account of the depth of a
specific mathematical theorem consists of the general criteria of mathematical
depth and the specific justification that the theorem we consider satisfies these
general criteria. In this paper, we propose three general criteria of mathemat-
ical depth: influence, fruitfulness and unity. We show that if adopting our
Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem can be
viewed as deep. As an application of our criteria, we justify for the depth
of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem by showing that it satisfies the Influence-
Fruitfulness-Unity criteria. Finally, we give some explanations of our account
of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
1. Introduction and motivation
“Mathematical depth” is an often used notion when mathematicians assess and
evaluate the work of their fellows. However, the notion is not well-defined and
there is no single widely accepted account of mathematical depth in the literature.
There is a lot of discussion of mathematical depth in the literature (see [Ernst, Heis,
Maddy, McNulty and Weatherall, 2015a, 2015b][Arana, 2015] [Gray, 2015] [Lange,
2015][Stillwell, 2015][Urquhart, 2015]). The following four types of questions have
been widely discussed in the current philosophical investigation (see [Ernst, Heis,
Maddy, McNulty and Weatherall, 2015, pp.155-162]): (1) is there agreement that
the cited examples are deep or not deep? (2) Are there commonalities in the kinds
of features cited in defense of depth and non-depth assessments in the various
examples? (3) Is depth the same as or different from such notions as fruitfulness,
surprisingness, importance, elegance, difficulty, fundamentalness, explanatoriness,
beauty, etc.? (4) Is depth an objective feature or something essentially tied to our
interests, abilities, and so on?
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is a well known theorem in foundations of math-
ematics. A natural question is: is Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem deep? For us,
the answer depends on our view of mathematical depth. For some views of math-
ematical depth, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem may not be deep. This paper is
motivated by the following question: if Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is consid-
ered as deep, what its depth consists in? We think that there are common general
criteria of mathematical depth behind different mathematical theorems that are
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considered as deep. For us, the goal of the philosophical investigation of mathe-
matical depth is finding the general criteria of mathematical depth. In this paper,
we make the following two thesis:
(1) The account of the depth of a specific mathematical theorem consists of the
general criteria of mathematical depth and the specific justification that the
theorem we consider satisfies these general criteria;
(2) The difference of the account of the depth of distinct mathematical theorems
lies in the difference among the specific justifications for distinct theorems.
In this paper, we use Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem as a case study for in-
vestigating mathematical depth. We examine the philosophical question of what
its depth consists in if it is considered as deep. In particular, we focus on the
methodological study of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, and attempt
to find some general criteria to account for its depth based on the current research
practice on incompleteness. In this paper, we first propose three general criteria
of mathematical depth: influence, fruitfulness and unity. As an application of our
Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria, we give an account of the depth of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem by justifying that it satisfies these general criteria. Our
justifications of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem only cover the most
important mathematical evidences of the three general criteria we know. We make
no attempt at completeness here. There are many more mathematical evidences
of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem in the literature than we can cover
here.
In this paper, our strategy of finding the general criteria of mathematical depth
is as follows: we first identify four dimensions of mathematical theorems. Corre-
sponding to the four dimensions, we propose four views of mathematical depth.
Then we analyze these four views to isolate some general criteria of mathematical
depth. Based on the analysis of the four views of mathematical depth, we propose
three general criteria of mathematical depth (Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity).
This paper attempts to bring some coherence to philosophical understandings of
the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. This work may help us to get a sense
of what counts as deep mathematics and why. We hope this work will advance our
philosophical understanding of mathematical depth, making way for more unified
accounts of mathematical depth to follow.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the motivation and
the main content of this paper. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem and a sketch of main ideas of the proof of Go¨del’s first
incompleteness theorem (G1) and Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem (G2). In
Section 3, we propose and explain our three general criteria of mathematical depth:
influence, fruitfulness and unity. In Section 4, we justify for the depth of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem showing that it satisfies the Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity
criteria. Finally, we give some explanations of our account of the depth of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem.
2. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
In this section, we give an overview of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. For
textbooks on Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, we refer to [Enderton 2001], [Mu-
rawski, 1999], [Lindstro¨m, 1997], [Smith, 2007], [Boolos, 1993]. For survey papers
on Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, we refer to [Smoryn´ski, 1977], [Beklemishev,
2010], [Kotlarski, 2004], [Buldt, 2014], [Visser, 2016], [Cheng, 2019c].
In this paper, arithmetization refers to the method in mathematical logic that
replaces reasonings on the expressions of first order language by reasonings on
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natural numbers. For this purpose, the replacement is constructed by some one-
to-one mapping of the set of all expressions (in the alphabet of the language under
consideration) into the natural number sequence. Relations and operations defined
on expressions are transformed by this mapping into relations and operations on
natural numbers. If unless stated otherwise, we always assume the arithmetization
of the base theory with a recursive set of non-logical constants. For more details
about arithmetization, we refer to [Murawski, 1999].
In this paper, we make the distinction between mathematics and meta-mathematics
even if in fact there is close relationship between the two. In this paper, we un-
derstand the mathematics/meta-mathematics distinction narrowly. We say that
an arithmetic sentence is meta-mathematical if its formulation refers to the use of
arithmetization. We refer to [Isaacson, 1987] for more discussions about the distinc-
tion between mathematical arithmetic sentences and meta-mathematical arithmetic
sentences.
We first review some basic notions used in this paper. We focus on a first order
theory with countable language. For a given theory T , L(T ) denotes the language
of T . Under arithmetization, any formula (or finite sequence of formulas) can be
coded by a natural number (called Go¨del’s number). We use pφq to denote the
corresponding numeral of the Go¨del number of a formula φ. We say a sentence φ
is independent of theory T if T 0 φ and T 0 ¬φ. A theory T is incomplete if there
is a sentence φ in L(T ) such that φ is independent of T ; otherwise, T is complete.
A theory T is recursively axiomatizable if it has a recursive set of axioms, i.e. the
set of Go¨del numbers of axioms of T is recursive. A n-ary relation R(x1, · · · , xn)
on Nn is representable in theory T iff there is a formula φ(x1, · · · , xn) such that if
R(m1, · · · ,mn) holds, then T ⊢ φ(m1, · · · ,mn);
1 and if R(m1, · · · ,mn) does not
hold, then T ⊢ ¬φ(m1, · · · ,mn).
Robinson Arithmetic Q was introduced in [Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson,
1953] as a base axiomatic theory for investigating incompleteness and undecidabil-
ity.
Definition 2.1. Robinson Arithmetic Q is defined in the language {0,S,+, ·} with
the following axioms:
Q1: ∀x∀y(Sx = Sy → x = y);
Q2: ∀x(Sx 6= 0);
Q3: ∀x(x 6= 0→ ∃yx = Sy);
Q4: ∀x∀y(x + 0 = x);
Q5: ∀x∀y(x + Sy = S(x+ y));
Q6: ∀x(x · 0 = 0);
Q7: ∀x∀y(x · Sy = x · y + x).
The theory PA consists of axiomsQ1-Q2, Q4-Q7 in Definition 2.1 and the axiom
scheme of induction (φ(0) ∧ ∀x(φ(x) → φ(Sx))) → ∀xφ(x), where φ is a formula
with at least one free variable x. Let N = 〈N,+,×〉 denote the standard model of
arithmetic. We say φ ∈ L(PA) is a true sentence of arithmetic if N |= φ. Define
Prov = {φ ∈ L(PA) : PA ⊢ φ} and Truth = {φ ∈ L(PA) : N |= φ}.
We introduce a hierarchy of L(PA)-formulas called the arithmetical hierarchy
(see [P. Ha´jek and P. Pudla´k, 1993]). Bounded formulas (Σ00, or Π
0
0, or ∆
0
0 formula)
are built from atomic formulas using only propositional connectives and bounded
quantifiers (in the form ∀x ≤ y or ∃x ≤ y). A formula is Σ0
n+1 if it has the form
∃xφ where φ is Π0n. A formula is Π
0
n+1 if it has the form ∀xφ where φ is Σ
0
n. Thus, a
Σ0
n
-formula has a block of n alternating quantifiers, the first one being existential,
1For n ∈ N, n¯ denotes the corresponding numeral in L(T ) for n.
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and this block is followed by a bounded formula. Similarly for Π0n-formulas. A
formula is ∆0
n
if it is equivalent to both a Σ0
n
formula and a Π0
n
formula.
A theory T is said to be ω-consistent if there is no formula ϕ(x) such that
T ⊢ ∃xϕ(x) and for any n ∈ N, T ⊢ ¬ϕ(n¯); and T is 1-consistent if there is no such
a ∆01 formula ϕ(x).
Go¨del proved his incompleteness theorem in [Go¨del, 1931] for a certain formal
system P related to Russell-Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica and based on the
simple theory of types over the natural number series and the Dedekind-Peano ax-
ioms (see [Beklemishev, 2010, p.3]). Go¨del’s original first incompleteness theorem
([Go¨del, 1931]) says that for any formal theory T formulated in the language of
P and obtained by adding a primitive recursive set of axioms to the system P,
if T is ω-consistent, then T is incomplete. Go¨del succeeded with his proof of the
incompleteness theorem because he recognized the central importance of distin-
guishing theory from metatheory, logic from meta-logic, signs from their referents
(see [Baaz, Papadimitriou, Putnam, Scott and Harper, 2014]). The following is a
modern reformulation of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem.
Theorem 2.2 (Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem (G1)). Let T be a recursively
axiomatized extension of PA. Then there exists a Go¨del’s sentence G such that:
(1) if T is consistent, then T 0G;
(2) if T is ω-consistent, then T 0 ¬G.
From Theorem 2.2, if T is ω-consistent, then Go¨del’s sentenceG is independent of
T and hence T is incomplete. For Go¨del’s proof, only assuming that T is consistent
is not enough to show that the Go¨del’s sentence is independent of T . In fact,
the optimal condition to show that Go¨del’s sentence is independent of T is that
T + Con(T ) is consistent (see [Isaacson, 2011, Theorems 35-36]). This optimal
condition is much weaker than ω-consistency.
Now, we give a sketch of the main idea of Go¨del’s proof of G1. In the rest of this
section, we assume that T is a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of PA
in L(PA). Go¨del’s proof of the incompleteness theorem depends on a long chain
of ideas, each involving a significant insight. The three main ideas in Go¨del’s proof
of G1 are arithmetization of the syntax of T , representability of recursive functions
in PA and self-reference construction of Go¨del’s sentence. Under the arithmeti-
zation, we could establish the one-to-one correspondence between expressions of
L(T ) and natural numbers. Under this correspondence, we can translate meta-
mathematical statements about the formal theory T into statements about natural
numbers. Moreover, fundamental metamathematical relations can be translated in
this way into certain recursive relations, hence into relations representable in theory
T . Consequently, one can speak about a formal system of arithmetic and about its
properties as a theory in the system itself! This is the essence of Go¨del’s idea of
arithmetization.2
Now, we can define some relations on N which express some metamathematical
properties of T . For example, we can define a binary relation on N2 as follows:
PrfT (m,n) iff n is the Go¨del’s number of a proof in T of the formula with Go¨del
numberm. Moreover, we can prove that the relationPrfT (m,n) is recursive. Go¨del
proved that every recursive relation is representable in PA. LetProofT (x, y) be the
formula which represents PrfT (m,n) in PA.
3 From the formula ProofT (x, y), we
can define the provability predicate ProvT (x) as ∃yProofT (x, y). Finally, Go¨del
effectively constructed Go¨del’s sentence G which asserts its own unprovability in T
2For more details on arithmetization, we refer to [Murawski, 1999].
3One can speak about the property of T in PA itself via arithmetization and representability!
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(i.e. T ⊢ G ↔ ¬ProvT (pGq)). Go¨del showed that if T is consistent, then T 0 G;
and if T is ω-consistent, then T 0 ¬G.
Since we will discuss general provability predicates based on proof predicates,
now we give a general definition of proof predicate which is a generalization of
properties of Go¨del’s proof predicate ProofT (x, y). We say a formula PrfT (x, y)
is a proof predicate of T if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) PrfT (x, y) is ∆
0
1(PA);
4
(2) PA ⊢ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ ∃yPrfT (x, y));
(3) for any n ∈ ω and formula φ,N |= ProofT (pφq, n)↔ PrfT (pφq, n);
(4) PA ⊢ ∀x∀x′∀y(PrfT (x, y) ∧PrfT (x
′, y)→ x = x′).
Note that each proof predicate represents the relation “y is the code of a proof in
T of a formula with Go¨del number x”. We define the provability predicate PrT (x)
from a proof predicate PrfT (x, y) by ∃yPrfT (x, y), and the consistency statement
Con(T ) from a provability predicate PrT (x) by ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q).
The following conditions D1-D3 are called drivability conditions of provability
predicate PrT (x).
D1: If T ⊢ ϕ, then T ⊢ PrT (pϕq);
D2: T ⊢ PrT (pϕq)→ (PrT (pϕ→ ψq)→ PrT (pψq));
D3: T ⊢ PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pPrT (pϕq)q).
We say a provability predicate is standard if it satisfies conditions D1-D3. In this
paper, if not specified, we assume that the provability predicate PrT (x) is stan-
dard and Con(T ) defined as ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q) is the canonical consistence statement
of T formulated via a standard provability predicate PrT (x). The importance of
standard provability predicate and canonical consistence statement lies in that G2
holds for the canonical consistence statement formulated via the standard provabil-
ity predicate as we will show. However, G2 may fail for non-standard provability
predicates and non-canonical consistence statements. There are a lot of research
on non-standard provability predicates and non-canonical consistence statements
in the literature (see [Feferman, 1960] and [Visser, 2011]).
Go¨del announced the second incompleteness theorem in an abstract published in
October 1930: no consistency proof of systems such as Principia, Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, or the systems investigated by Ackermann and von Neumann is possible
by methods that can be formulated in these systems (see [Zach, 2007, p.431]). In
the modern formulation, the second incompleteness theorem states that if T is
consistent, then the arithmetical formula Con(T ) that expresses the consistency
of T is not provable in T .5 For the proof of G2, the key point is that since the
provability predicate PrT (x) is standard and satisfies conditions D1-D3, we can
show that T ⊢ Con(T )↔ G. Thus, G2 holds: if T is consistent, then T 0 Con(T ).
However, only assuming that T is consistent is not sufficient to show that T 0
¬Con(T ). But we can prove that Con(T ) is independent of T by assuming that T
is 1-consistent which is stronger than “T is consistent”.6 For more details of proofs
of G1 and G2, we refer to Chapter 2 in [Murawski, 1999].
3. An account of mathematical depth
For us, an account of the depth of a specific mathematical theorem consists of
two parts: the general criteria of mathematical depth and the specific justification
4We say a formula φ is ∆01(PA) if there exists a Σ
0
1 formula α such that PA ⊢ φ ↔ α, and
there exists a Π01 formula β such that PA ⊢ φ↔ β.
5Even if Con(T ) is not provable in T , T is reflective: for each finite sub-theory S of T ,
T ⊢ Con(S) (see [Murawski, 1999, Theorem 2.6.12]).
6It is an easy fact that if T is 1-consistent and S is not a theorem of T , then PrT (pSq) is not
a theorem of T .
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that the theorem we consider satisfies these general criteria. In this section, we will
do the first part and propose three general criteria of mathematical depth. In the
next section, we will apply our general criteria to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
to account for its depth.
Our methodology of finding the general criteria of mathematical depth is as
follows: we first isolate four dimensions of mathematical theorems, and then propose
four views of mathematical depth based on these four dimensions. Then we analyze
some qualities of mathematical theorems which are linked to mathematical depth
according to the corresponding view of mathematical depth. Based on this analysis,
we isolate three general criteria of mathematical depth. Finally, we give some
explanations of our general criteria of mathematical depth. In Section 4, we will
apply our general criteria (Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity) to account for the depth
of a well known theorem: Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
The structure of this section is as follows. In Section 3.1, we isolate four dimen-
sions of mathematical theorems and propose four views of mathematical depth.
Then, based on our four views of mathematical depth, we discuss some qualities
of mathematical theorems which may be linked to mathematical depth. The mo-
tivation of this analysis is to isolate some qualities of mathematical theorems as
the general criteria of mathematical depth. In Section 3.2, based on the analysis
in Section 3.1, we propose three general criteria (Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity) of
mathematical depth and give some explanations of them.
3.1. Four dimensions of mathematical theorems. For us, the depth of a math-
ematical theorem is not an essential intrinsic property of the theorem but a property
of research practice of this theorem. Depth is historically located or contextual. A
theorem may not seem deep after its first publication, but appears deep in appli-
cation. What people once thought deep could turn out not to be.7 Thus, for us,
research practice is an important dimension of mathematical theorems for the ac-
count of mathematical depth. Based on this view, each mathematical theorem has
the following four dimensions: author (the people who prove the theorem), proof
(the mathematical proof of the theorem), consequence (the conclusion that follows
from the theorem) and research practice (the research conducted by the academic
community on this theorem after its publication).
This paper is written in the same spirit of Arana’s [2015]. After introducing
Szemere´di’s Theorem and gesturing at its proofs, Arana [2015] articulates four dif-
ferent accounts of the depth of Szemere´di’s Theorem (genetic views, evidentialist
views, consequentialist views, and cosmological views), and indicates ways in which
each is apt and inapt for characterizing depth as it occurs in mathematical prac-
tice. However, Arana’s four views of depth have features that many philosophers
would consider problematic: either by falling into vagueness, by failing to pick out
theorems that obviously count as deep, or by making depth subjective (see [Ernst,
Heis, Maddy, McNulty, and Weatherall, 2015a]). Based on Arana’s work in [2015],
corresponding to the four dimensions of mathematical theorems, we propose four
views of mathematical depth: the genetic view, the evidentialist view, the conse-
quentialist view, and the research practice view. Our genetic view and evidentialist
view is the same as Arana’s views in [2015]. Our consequentialist view is similar as
Arana’s view with some modifications. Our research practice view is different from
and covers Arana’s cosmological view of depth.8
7For example, the theorem on the irrationality of the square root of two was regarded as deep
by the ancients, but perhaps today it appears too simple to be deep (see [Ernst, Heis, Maddy,
McNulty, and Weatherall, 2015a]).
8Arana’s cosmological view of depth measures the depth of a theorem by measuring the order
the theorem has established and the unexpected structure it has revealed.
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Each view of mathematical depth links the depth of a theorem with some quality
of the theorem. The goal of this section is to analyze some qualities of mathemat-
ical theorems according to these views of mathematical depth. There are many
qualities of mathematical theorems, and it is impossible for us to analyze all of
them here. In this section, we only analyze those representative qualities of math-
ematical theorems which may be viewed as a candidate criterion of mathematical
depth. Based on the analysis in this section, we will isolate three general criteria
of mathematical depth in Section 3.2.
Following Arana’s [2015], our genetic view of depth holds that a deep theorem
is identified as one proved by sufficiently talented mathematicians. However, as
discussed in [2015], this view is very problematic. As Arana pointed out, if we
consider results proved by a talented mathematician as deep, then a trivial exercise
solved by a talented mathematician will also be considered as deep, that is very
ridiculous. For us, the depth of a mathematical theorem is not relevant to the
status of the author (such as talent, reputation, influence, etc.) but only related to
the mathematical work of the author.
Following Arana’s [2015], our evidentialist view of depth holds that the depth of
a theorem is linked to some quality of its proofs (such as complex, impure, original,
difficult and having multiple distinct proofs). The depth of mathematical theorems
and the depth of mathematical proofs are two distinct notions. In this paper, we
focus on the qualities of mathematical proofs that reflect the depth of mathematical
theorems. We refer to [Lange, 2015] for more discussions of the difference between
the depth of theorems and the depth of proofs.
Our consequentialist view of depth is essentially the same as Arana’s with minor
modifications. Our consequentialist view of depth holds that the depth of a theorem
is linked to some quality of its consequences, or of the consequences of its proofs.9
For us, the notion “a theorem leads to another theorem” in Arana’s consequentialist
view is vague. There are two cases for which we can say that theorem A leads to
theorem B: theorem B is a (mathematical or philosophical) consequence of theorem
A, or theorem B is related to theorem A (such as generalizations of theorem A, re-
sults that deepen our understanding of theorem A, etc). We distinguish the notion
“a (mathematical or philosophical) consequence of theorem A” with the notion “a
result not implied by theorem A but is related to theorem A”. The former notion
is about logical or philosophical consequences of theorem A; but the latter notion
is about results related to theorem A, that are not direct logical or philosophical
consequences of theorem A. In this paper, the notion “theorem A leads to theorem
B” is used in the narrow sense: theorem B is not a direct consequence of theorem
A, but is related to theorem A. For example, “Prov is a proper subset of Truth” is
a direct logical consequence of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem. After Go¨del,
people have found many generalizations of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. These
generalizations are not direct logical consequences of Go¨del’s theorem, but are new
results about Go¨del’s theorem. Take another example, after Go¨del, people have
found many independent sentences of PA from number theory and combinatorics.
These independent sentences from classic mathematics are different from Go¨del’s
sentence which is a pure logical construction via meta-mathematical method with-
out any number theoretic or combinatorial content even if they both show that PA
is incomplete. Thus, proving G1 via independent sentences from classic mathemat-
ics is not a logical consequence of G1 but new results about G1 discovered during
the research practice on incompleteness after Go¨del.
9In Arana’s [2015], the consequentialist view of depth measures the depth of a theorem by some
quality of its consequences, or of the consequences of its proofs, the degree to which a theorem
(or a proof of a theorem) leads to yet further important theorems and proofs.
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The research practice view of depth links the depth of a theorem with some
quality of the theorem that can only be revealed by the long term research practice
on this theorem. For example, the influence of a theorem can only be revealed by the
long term research practice on this theorem. A theorem may have common qualities
from different views of depth. For example, from the evidentialist view, a theorem
may be viewed as fruitful in the sense that it has many distinct proofs; from the
consequentialist view, a theorem may be viewed as fruitful in the sense that it has
many important consequences; and from the research practice view, this theorem
may be viewed as fruitful in the sense that it has many generalizations and wide
applications in varied fields during the long-term research practice on this theorem
after Go¨del. In the following, we discuss some qualities of mathematical theorems
or proofs to which mathematical depth is linked according to our evidentialist view,
consequentialist view and research practice view.
Now, we first discuss some qualities of proofs which may be linked to the depth of
mathematical theorems. The complexity of a proof is an indicator of the difficulty
of the proof. One indicator of the complexity of a proof is the length of the proof.
Having a long proof is not a sufficient condition for a theorem to be deep. A theorem
with a long proof may not be deep: for example, a proof may be very long with a
lot of calculations but the idea behind it is very simple without any originality. A
deep theorem should not have too short proofs since a very short proof is usually
regarded as a sign of the simplicity of the theorem even if this short proof may
be very clear and technical. A theorem with a long proof written by one author
may in fact have a much shorter proof written by another author. However, even if
disregarding the individuation of proofs, there is no objective measure for a proof
to be long.
The complexity of a proof can be measured by some formal methods in logic
such as the proof complexity or the proof theoretic strength of the proof (e.g. how
strong axioms are needed to derive the theorem). The proof-theoretical approach,
such as Reverse Mathematics, provides us with a method to measure the logical
strength of different proofs. A theorem with a complex proof may not be deep.
The main problem to measure the depth of a theorem via its complexity is that
there is no objective measure for a theorem with complex proofs to be deep. The
complexity of a proof is related to the logical complexity of the statement of the
theorem. For example, usually a proof of a Π02020 statement is more complex than
a proof of a Π01 statement. However, it does not make sense to claim that any Π
0
2020
statement is deeper than any Π01 statement.
Impurity is a quite different type of quality of mathematical proofs. We say a
proof is impure if the proof appeals to concepts or tools other than those in the
statement proved, or involves areas of mathematics superficially distinct from the
statement of the theorem itself. Impurity is an indicator of the difficulty of the
proof: we have no direct proof of the result and have to use some intermediate
concepts or tools, or techniques from different fields of mathematics. A typical
example of an impure proof is the transfer theorem in logic. A general form of
transfer theorem is as follows: in order to prove A⇒ B, we isolate an intermediate
statement C, and prove that A ⇒ C and C ⇒ B.10 A theorem with an impure
proof may not be deep. However, all theorems we know, that are considered as
deep, have impure proofs.
10Take a specific example, in set theory, large cardinal and determinacy are two important
and profound fields. The transfer theorem shows that Determinacy of some games is equivalent
to the existence of some kinds of large cardinals, and all known proofs of this theorem use some
intermediate statement A. I.e. the proof of the transfer theorem is done in two steps: first show
that Determinacy for some kind of games implies the statement A; then show that the statement
A implies the existence of some large cardinals.
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We say a proof is original if the proof has some original ideas, or contains sur-
prising insights, or invents some new tools or techniques. The method involved in
an original proof is totally new and ground-breaking. An original proof may trans-
form a field or open a new one. A typical example of original proofs in set theory
is Cohen’s proof that the continuum hypothesis is independent of ZFC in which he
created the technique of forcing, a very powerful and useful tool in mathematical
logic. An original proof is not just the combinations of some known techniques. A
theorem with an original proof may not be deep. But a deep theorem should have
original proofs. If a theorem has no original proof, this theorem may just follow
from known results and be too easy to be a deep theorem.
A deep theorem may have many different proofs and these proofs may have varied
properties. A natural question is: if a theorem has distinct proofs and its depth is
linked to its proofs, then the depth of this theorem should be measured by which
proofs? Here are some strategies: all proofs, some proofs, the original proof, the
shortest proof, the most difficult proof, etc. Bracketing the issue of individuation
of proofs, for us, the depth of mathematical theorems is linked to the common
qualities of most different proofs by which mathematical depth can be measured.
To isolate general criteria of mathematical depth, we want our criteria to be
more abstract. Now, we discuss a more abstract quality of mathematical proofs:
difficulty. The specific qualities we have discussed such as complex, impure and
original can be viewed as distinct indicators of the quality of difficulty. In our
context of mathematical depth, we say that a mathematical proof is difficult if it
shares at least one of the following qualities: complex, impure and original. A
complex proof may need a lot of mathematical work and hence can be viewed as
difficult. However, the degree of the logical complexity of a difficult proof may not
be very high. An impure proof may have to use advanced tools and techniques
from distinct fields, and hence can be viewed as difficult. However, a difficult proof
may not be impure. An original proof may invent new tools and techniques, and
hence can be viewed as difficult. However, a difficult proof may not be original. A
theorem with a difficult proof may not be deep. But a deep theorem usually has
difficult proofs. A theorem with a very easy proof is usually not regarded as deep.
The difficulty of a mathematical proof is maturity-dependent. At Go¨del’s time,
Go¨del’s proof of his incompleteness theorem is widely viewed as difficult. But nowa-
days, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and its proof are now standard materials in
the textbook for first year logic graduate students, and Go¨del’s proof of his incom-
pleteness theorem is no longer considered as complex compared with the complex
techniques in meta-mathematics of arithmetic developed after Go¨del. Another ex-
ample of maturity dependence is Conhen’s proof that the continuum hypothesis
(CH) is independent of ZFC. In Cohen’s time, his proof definitely is original,
technical and difficult. However, after Cohen, forcing becomes an important and
popular tool in set theory. Conhen’s application of forcing in his proof of the in-
dependence of CH uses a very simple forcing notion. Compared with the later
development of forcing in set theory, nowadays Cohen’s proof of the independence
of CH is no longer regarded as difficult in the community of mathematical logic.
We say that a mathematical result is important if it answers some foundational
questions, and has significant meanings and profound consequences. The depth of
a mathematical theorem is linked to the importance of its consequences. A deep
theorem should have important consequences. If we just look at the conclusion of
Fermat’s last theorem, it is hard to regard it as deep since it only tells us that
some kind of equations in number theory have no solution. The question “whether
xn+ yn = zn has natural number solutions for n > 2” is a famous open question in
10 YONG CHENG
classic mathematics but not a foundational question with profound meanings com-
pared with Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. This partially explains the reason that
Fermat’s last theorem itself is not necessarily considered as deep in the literature
(see [Ernst, Heis, Maddy, McNulty and Weatherall, 2015a]) even if Andrew Wiles’s
proof of Fermat’s last theorem is widely regarded as deep mathematics. However,
a theorem with important consequences may not be deep.
In the following, we discuss the quality of fruitfulness from both the consequen-
tialist view and the research practice view, and discuss the quality of influence and
unity from the research practice view. The influence of a theorem means the impact
of this theorem on different scientific fields during the research practice. The fruit-
fulness of a theorem means that this theorem has “important” consequences and
multiple “difficult” proofs, and leads to many new “important” theorems during
the research practice. The unity of a theorem means that this theorem ties to-
gether apparently disparate fields, and draws interconnections between these fields
during the research practice. It is hard to say that any one of these qualities (in-
fluence, fruitfulness and unity) alone is a sufficient condition for a theorem to be
deep. The influence, fruitfulness and unity of mathematical theorems as we defined
all contribute to mathematical depth. If a theorem is deep, it should have impact
on different scientific fields, have “important” consequences, have multiple “diffi-
cult” proofs, lead to many new “important” theorems, and tie together apparently
disparate fields and draw interconnections between these fields. However, we do
not know any example of mathematical depth that fails on all these three qualities
(influence, fruitfulness and unity).
In summary, based on the four dimensions of mathematical theorems (author,
proof, consequence and research practice), we have examined some qualities of
mathematical theorems which may be linked to mathematical depth such as com-
plexity, impurity, originality, difficulty, diversity of the proofs, importance, influ-
ence, fruitfulness, unity, etc. Any one of these qualities alone is not a sufficient
condition for a theorem to be deep. However, we have isolated some qualities
which we think are necessary for a theorem to be deep. Based on this analysis, we
will propose our general criteria of mathematical depth in the next section. In this
section, we have explained the exact meaning of the notions of “important” and
“difficult”. In the rest of this paper, whenever we use these two notions, we will
use quotation marks to refer to the notions as we explained in this section.
3.2. Three general criteria. For us, the goal of the philosophical investigation of
mathematical depth should be finding the general criteria of mathematical depth.
We should seek for the general criteria of mathematical depth for all theorems
rather than for a specific theorem that may be considered as deep. Even if we have
found different criteria of the depth of distinct theorems, it is still reasonable for us
to find the general criteria for a theorem to be deep behind these distinct criteria
for different theorems. So we want our criteria to be abstract and general enough
so that they can reflect the common qualities of distinct theorems from varied fields
of mathematics which are considered as deep.
Based on our analysis of the four views of mathematical depth, we propose three
general criteria of mathematical depth (Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity).
Influence: Has impact on different scientific fields.
Fruitfulness: (1) Has “important” consequences;
(2) Has multiple “difficult” proofs;
(3) Leads to many new “important” theorems.
Unity: Ties together apparently disparate fields and draws interconnections
between these fields.
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In the rest of this section, we give some explanations of our Influence-Fruitfulness-
Unity criteria, and discuss some possible objections to our account of general criteria
of mathematical depth.
Our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria are reasonable in the sense that they
cover the most important qualities of the three dimensions of mathematical theo-
rems (proof, consequence and research practice), which are linked to mathematical
depth. We do not know any example of mathematical depth that fails on all the
three criteria we proposed. Our three criteria are not sufficient conditions for a
theorem to be deep. We can not say that if a theorem is influential (or fruitful, or
exhibiting unity) in our sense, then this theorem is deep. For example, a theorem
may be influential but not widely considered as deep. However, for us, these three
criteria are necessary for a theorem to be deep in the sense that a deep theorem is ex-
pected to have impact on different scientific fields, have “important” consequences,
have multiple “difficult” proofs, lead to many new “important” theorems, and tie
together apparently disparate fields and draw interconnections between these fields.
For example, we do not know whether there might be an example of mathematical
depth without fruitfulness.
Note that our three general criteria come in degrees. The degree of influence
comes in the degree to which a theorem has impact on different scientific fields.
The degree of fruitfulness comes in the degree to which a theorem has “important”
consequences, has multiple “difficult” proofs and leads to further “important” the-
orems. The degree of unity comes in the degree to which a theorem ties together
apparently disparate fields and draws interconnections between these fields. This
may provide us with a route, which is at least theoretically possible, to compare
the depth of different theorems.
In the literature, some criteria for mathematical depth have been proposed. From
[Ernst, Heis, Maddy, McNulty, and Weatherall, 2015b], the following five candidate
criteria for mathematical depth have gained the widest support:
(1) ties together apparently disparate fields;
(2) involves impurity (definitions that reach into higher types, proofs that appeal
to concepts other than those in the statement proved);
(3) finds order in chaos;
(4) exhibits organizational or explanatory power;
(5) transforms a field or opens a new one.
Our three criteria cover the above five criteria. Compare our three criteria of
mathematical depth with the above five criteria, our three criteria are more abstract
and general than the above five criteria. Our criteria of influence and unity are
related to Arana’s cosmological view. Our criterion of fruitfulness is related to
Arana’s evidentialist view and consequentialist view. Compare our three criteria of
mathematical depth with Arana’s four views of depth, our three criteria are more
specific and comprehensive than Arana’s four views of depth.
Now, we discuss three possible objections to our account of general criteria
of mathematical depth. The first is the vagueness objection which claims that
the Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria are vague and not well-defined since the
words such as “important” and “difficult” are vague. We admit that our Influence-
Fruitfulness-Unity criteria are vague and some notions in them are informal. For
us, it is hard to give a completely precise definition of them since in our definitions
we need to use some primitive notions for which we have to appeal to intuition.
But in our context of mathematical depth, we have explained the exact meaning
of notions in our three criteria as far as we can. Our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity
criteria only provide us with a general framework or perspective for our account of
mathematical depth. The account of the depth of a mathematical theorem lies in
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the specific justification that this theorem satisfies our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity
criteria. These justifications are the full-blooded realization of our three general
criteria of mathematical depth.
The second is the insufficiency objection which claims that influence, fruitfulness
and unity are not sufficient and complete criteria of mathematical depth. As far as
we know, our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria cover most key candidate criteria
of mathematical depth in the literature. As far as we can imagine at this stage,
the ‘Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity’ criteria are our ideal model of general criteria
of mathematical depth. We admit that there may be other better formulations
of general criteria of mathematical depth. For different possible formulations of
general criteria of mathematical depth, we can compare them to find a better one
in a rational way.
The third is the subjectivity objection which claims that our criteria are subjec-
tive since some conditions such as importance, influence and unity in our criteria
are subjective. Firstly, we admit that our criteria are subjective in the sense that
some criteria depend on the level of research practice. But we can justify that a the-
orem satisfies these criteria in an objective way based on mathematical evidences.
Secondly, the subjectivity of some criteria of mathematical depth is inevitable in
the sense that mathematical depth is not an essential intrinsic property of the the-
orem but a property of research practice of this theorem. But the evaluation of the
depth of mathematical theorems can be changed during the research practice. The
degrees of influence, fruitfulness and unity of mathematical theorems depend on
the level of research practice. We can say that our criteria are globally subjective
with respect to the open and boundless research practice, and are locally objective
based on mathematical justifications of these criteria with respect to the fixed time
period of research practice.
4. A justification of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
In this section, we apply our three general criteria of mathematical depth to
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems. We justify for the depth of Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorem based on the current research practice, and show that Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorem satisfies our three criteria: influence, fruitfulness and unity. Our
justification that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem satisfies the Influence-Fruitfulness-
Unity criteria is based on mathematical evidences from the current research practice
on incompleteness. However, it is in principle impossible for us to present all mathe-
matical evidences of our criteria. In this paper, we only present the most important
mathematical evidences as far as we know up to the current research practice on
incompleteness. In this sense, our justification here is only a sketch of the structure
of a possible full account of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
The structure of this section is as follows. In Section 4.1, we justify for the
influence of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems from its impact on foundations of
mathematics, philosophy, mathematics and theoretic computer science. In Section
4.2, we justify for the fruitfulness of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem showing that
it has many “important” consequences, has multiple “difficult” proofs, and leads to
many new “important” theorems. Especially, we justify that Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorem leads to many new “important” theorems by showing that it can be
generalized to both extensions of PA and subsystems of PA, and by showing the
boundary (or the limit) of the theorem (i.e. under what conditions the theorem
holds and under what conditions the theorem fails). In Section 4.3, we justify for
the unity of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, and show that Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorem ties together apparently disparate fields and draws interconnections
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between these fields. In Section 4.4, we give some explanations of our account of
the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
4.1. Influence. In this section, we justify for the influence of Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorem from its impact on foundations of mathematics, philosophy, math-
ematics and theoretic computer science, that is revealed by the research practice
on incompleteness after Go¨del. We make no attempt to exhaustively discuss the
full impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and all of the ongoing important
research programs that it suggests.
On the impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, Feferman said: “their rel-
evance to mathematical logic (and its offspring in the theory of computation) is
paramount; further, their philosophical relevance is significant, but in just what
way is far from settled; and finally, their mathematical relevance outside of logic
is very much unsubstantiated but is the object of ongoing, tantalizing efforts” (see
[Feferman, 2006, p. 434]).
Hilbert’s program has two main goals: (1) proving all true mathematical proposi-
tions in the formalization of mathematics; (2) finding a proof that no contradiction
can be obtained in the formalism of mathematics using only finitistic reasoning
about definite mathematical objects. There is extensive literature about the de-
velopment of Hilbert’s program and its effect on mathematical logic (especially
proof theory) and philosophy of mathematics (see [Feferman, 1988], [Franks, 2009],
[Murawski, 1999], [Simpson, 1988], [Zach, 2007]).
For us, the impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem on foundations of math-
ematics is mainly embodied in the following two aspects: (1) Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorem reveals the independence phenomenon which is common in logic and
mathematics; (2) Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem has profound influence on the
development of Hilbert’s program.
Nowadays, independence is ubiquitous in logic. The independence phenome-
non reveals the big gap between mathematical truth and provability in formal
systems. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem firstly reveals the independence phenom-
enon of formal systems at the level of arithmetic, and shows the essential limitation
of any formal system containing enough information of arithmetic. After Go¨del,
people have found many arithmetic sentences from classic mathematics that are
independent of PA. The sequent research after Go¨del reveals the independence
phenomenon of stronger formal systems such as higher order arithmetic and ZFC.
For example, Go¨del and Cohen show that CH is independent of ZFC, that means
ZFC is essentially incomplete to capture all set-theoretic truth.11 Moreover, people
have found many examples of statements that are independent of ZFC from varied
fields of mathematics such as analysis, algebra, topology and mathematical logic in
the current research practice on independence.
Now, we give a brief account of the impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
on Hilbert’s program. Note that G1 refutes the first goal of Hilbert’s program. A
popular view of G2 is that it denies the second goal of Hilbert’s program since it de-
molishes the goal of proving the consistency of mathematics by finitistic reasoning.
It is difficult to answer the question of whether there are finitary consistency proofs
of PA since there is no generally accepted formal definition of the informal concept
of finitary proof. If we regard finitary mathematics as being formalizable in PA,
then it is impossible to give finitary proofs of the consistency of PA as G2 shows.
However, Go¨del’s work in [Go¨del, 1931] left open the possibility that there could be
finitary methods which are not formalizable in the base system and which would
11 Go¨del proposed the research program to find new axioms of set theory to capture all set-
theoretic truth, that is one of the central motivations of current research in set theory.
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yield the required consistency proof. Go¨del himself suggested the possibility of giv-
ing finitary consistency proofs by adopting the principle of transfinite induction on
certain primitive recursive well-orderings, which cannot be formalized in PA, but
can be treated as finitistic (see [Murawski, 1999, p. 309-310]). Thus, Go¨del adopts
a more liberal view of what finitary methods might be allowed.12 The problem with
such extended forms of Hilbert’s program is that there are many different styles
of constructivity,13 and the concept of constructivity in general is much less clear
even than that of finitism (see [Feferman,1988, p. 366]). Go¨del and Bernays’s ideas
are realized by Gerhard Gentzen who proved the consistency of PA by introducing
the principle of induction up to the ordinal ǫ0. The only part of Gentzen’s proof
that was not clearly finitary was the transfinite induction up to the ordinal ǫ0. If
this transfinite induction is accepted as a finitary method, then one can assert that
there is a finitary proof of the consistency of PA.14
Even if G2 struck Hilbert’s program and revealed several difficulties in attempts
to realize it, Hilbert’s program still can be partially realized, and has inspired
various investigations in foundations and philosophy of mathematics.15 Gentzen’s
work opened a new and productive direction to develop Hilbert’s program: finding
the means necessary to prove the consistency of a given theory.16 The program
of so-called reverse mathematics developed by Friedman and Simpson contributes
to provide us with another partial realization of Hilbert’s program. In the face of
Go¨del’s results showing that not all of classical mathematics can be reduced to and
justified by finitistic mathematics, one can ask: how much of classical mathematics
can be so reduced? Reverse mathematics is a highly developed research program to
give a precise answer to this question by investigating which set existence axioms
are needed in order to prove theorems of ordinary mathematics. Despite Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem, reverse mathematics provides us with a route to give a
finitistic reduction for a substantial portion of infinitistic mathematics including
many of the best-known nonconstructive theorems (see [Simpson, 1988]).
Now, we give a brief account of the impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem in
mathematics. In this paper, we say an arithmetic sentence has real mathematical
contents if it is a number theoretic or combinational statement, and its formulation
does not use arithmetization. We say an arithmetic sentence is natural (other-
wise artificial) if it has real mathematical contents. It has been often thought that
12It seems that Bernays was among the first to recognize the need for a generalization of
Hilbert’s program by loosening the requirement of reduction to finitary methods, allowing reduc-
tion to constructive methods more generally. This is evidenced by his remark (see [Feferman,
1988, p.365]): “it thus became apparent that the finitary argument is not the only alternative to
classical ways of reasoning and is not necessarily implied by the idea of proof theory. An enlarging
of the methods of proof theory was therefore suggested: instead of a reduction to finitist methods
of reasoning, it was required only that the arguments be of a constructive character, allowing us
to deal with more general forms of inference.”
13 There are many forms of constructivism. These include the program of intuitionism founded
by Brouwer, the finitism of Hilbert and Bernays, the constructive recursive mathematics of Shanin
and Markov, and Bishop’s program of constructive analysis. Constructivism also includes the
study of constructive set theories such as CZF and the study of topos theory.
14Gentzen’s result that for all α < ǫ0, PA proves the principle of induction up to the ordinal
α and induction up to ǫ0 establishes the consistency of PA, constitutes an ordinal analysis of PA,
and we say that ǫ0 is the proof theoretic ordinal of PA (see [Zach, 2007, p. 436]).
15For example, ordinal analysis, functional interpretations, proof theoretic reductions and
reverse mathematics are the most prominent areas situated in the tradition of Hilbert’s program
(see [Zach, 2007, p. 440]).
16More powerful subsystems of second order arithmetic have been given consistency proofs by
Gaisi Takeuti and others, and the theories that have been proved consistent by these methods are
quite strong and include most ordinary mathematics.
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Go¨del’s proof of G1 uses pure logical method and has no relevance with mathemat-
ics: Go¨del’s sentence constructed via the meta-mathematical method is artificial
and has no real mathematical content. Go¨del’s sentence is constructed not by re-
flecting about arithmetical properties of natural numbers, but by reflecting about
an axiomatic system in which those properties are formalized (see [Isaacson, 1987]).
A natural question after Go¨del is: can we find examples of “natural” independent
sentences with real mathematical contents? We call the incompleteness phenome-
non revealed by “natural” independent sentences with real mathematical contents
as concrete incompleteness.
In fact, the incompleteness phenomenon prevails in classic mathematics. The
research program of concrete incompleteness seeks for “natural” independent sen-
tences with real mathematical contents. After Go¨del, many “natural” independent
sentences with real mathematical contents have been found. These independent
sentences have a clear mathematical flavor and do not refer to the arithmetization
of syntax and provability predicate. Paris and Harrington [1977] proposed a math-
ematically natural true statement unprovable in PA: Paris-Harrington Principle
(PH). Following PH, many other mathematically “natural” statements indepen-
dent of PA with combinatorial or number-theoretic content were formulated: the
Kanamori-McAloon principle [Kanamori and McAloon, 1987], the Kirby-Paris sen-
tence [Kirby and Paris, 1982], the Hercules-Hydra game [Kirby and Paris, 1982],
the Worm principle [Beklemishev, 2003][Hamano and Okada, 1997], the flipping
principle [Kirby, 1982], the arboreal statement [Mills, 1980], P.Pudla´k’s Principle
[Pudla´k, 1979][Ha´jek and Paris, 1986], the kiralic and regal principles [Clote and
McAloon, 1983] (see [Bovykin, 2006, p. 40]). All these statements are thought of
as much more genuinely and purely mathematical than the Go¨del’s sentence, and
reveal the concrete incompleteness of first order arithmetic.
Harvey Friedman is a leading researcher in the field of concrete incompleteness.
Friedman’s work extends the research on concrete incompleteness from first order
arithmetic to higher order arithmetic. Friedman’s book “Boolean Relation Theory
and Incompleteness” is a comprehensive monograph on concrete incompleteness in
mathematics, and provides many examples of concrete mathematical theorems not
provable in subsystems of second-order arithmetic stronger than PA, and a num-
ber of concrete mathematical statements provable in third-order arithmetic but not
provable in second-order arithmetic (see [Friedman, forthcoming]). Cheng [2015,
2019a] found a concrete mathematical theorem “Harrington’s principle implies the
existence of zero sharp” based on Harrington’s principle, and showed that this
theorem is expressible in second-order arithmetic, not provable in second-order or
third-order arithmetic, but provable in fourth-order arithmetic. Many other exam-
ples of concrete mathematical incompleteness and the discussion of this subject in
1970s-1980s can be found in [Simpson, 1987], [Simpson, 1985], [Pacholski, 1980],
[Berline, McAloon and Ressayre, 1981]. For more discussions of concrete incom-
pleteness, we refer to [Cheng, 2019a], [Bovykin, 2006] and [Friedman, forthcoming].
The impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is not confined to the community
of mathematicians and logicians, and it has been very popular and widely used
outside mathematics and logic. In the literature, there are a lot of discussions
about the philosophical meaning of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem (see [Gaif-
man, 2000][Resnik, 1974] [Auerbach, 1985][Detlefsen, 1979][Detlefsen, 1980][Franks,
2009][Pudla´k, 1999]). Franzen’s [Franzen, 2005] is a popular book about the use
and misuse of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem in and outside mathematics and
logic.
A natural question is: what is the philosophical depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem if any? Intuitively, there are big differences between mathematical depth
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and philosophical depth of a theorem. It is an interesting future research project
to examine the difference between mathematical depth and philosophical depth, as
well as the philosophical depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. In this paper, we
focus on mathematical depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. In the following,
we only give a brief account of the philosophical impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem on the Anti-Mechanism Argument and Go¨del’s Disjunctive Thesis.
There are a lot of discussions in the literature about the influence of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem on the philosophical question of whether the mind can
be mechanized (see [Penrose, 1989] [Chalmers, 1995] [Lucas, 1996] [Lindstro¨m,
2006] [Feferman, 2009] [Shapiro, 1998] [Shapiro, 2003] [Koellner, 2016] [Koellner,
2018a][Koellner, 2018b] [Cheng, 2020]). The Anti-Mechanism Argument claims
that the mind cannot be mechanized in the sense that the mathematical outputs
of the idealized human mind outstrip the mathematical outputs of any Turing ma-
chine.17 A popular interpretation of G1 is that G1 implies that the Anti-Mechanism
Argument holds. Go¨del did not argue that his incompleteness theorem implies that
the mind cannot be mechanized. For Go¨del, the human mind cannot be mechanized
and human mind is sufficiently powerful to capture all mathematical truths. Go¨del
believes that the distinctiveness of the human mind when compared to a Turing
machine is evident in its ability to come up with new axioms and develop new
mathematical theories. Based on his rationalistic optimism, Go¨del believed that
we are arithmetically omniscient. However, Go¨del admits that he cannot give a
convincing argument for either the thesis “the human mind cannot be mechanized”
or the thesis “there are absolutely undecidable statements”. Go¨del thought that
the most he could claim from his incompleteness theorem is a weaker conclusion,
Go¨del’s Disjunctive Thesis (GD),18 which claims that if the human mind can be
mechanized, then there are absolutely undecidable statements in the sense that
there are mathematical truths that cannot be proved by the idealized human mind.
Go¨del’s Disjunctive Thesis concerns the limit of mathematical knowledge and the
possibility of the existence of mathematical truths that are inaccessible to the ide-
alized human mind (we refer to [Horsten and Welch, 2016] for more discussions of
the status of GD).
For Go¨del, GD is a mathematically established fact of great philosophical interest
which follows from his incompleteness theorem, and it is entirely independent from
the standpoint taken toward the foundation of mathematics (see [Go¨del, 1951]).19
For more detailed discussions of Go¨del’s Disjunctive Thesis and the relationship
between Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and the Anti-Mechanism Argument, we
refer to [Cheng, 2020], [Horsten and Welch, 2016] and Koellner’s recent nice papers
[Koellner, 2016, 2018a, 2018b].
Now, we give a brief account of the impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
on theoretic computer science. Theoretical computer science is about the power
and limitations of computation. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem contains several
17We will not consider the performance of actual human minds, with their limitations and
defects; but only consider the idealized human mind and look at what it can do in principle. See
[Koellner, 2018a].
18The original version of GD was introduce by Go¨del in [Go¨del, 1995], p. 310: “So the following
disjunctive conclusion is inevitable: either mathematics is incompletable in this sense, that its
evident axioms can never be comprised in a finite rule, that is to say, the human mind (even
within the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely surpasses the powers of any finite machine, or
else there exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems of the type specified (where the case
that both terms of the disjunction are true is not excluded, so that there are, strictly speaking,
three alternatives)”.
19In the literature, there is a consensus that Go¨del’s argument for GD is definitive, but until
now we have no compelling evidence for or against any of the two disjuncts (see [Horsten and
Welch, 2016]).
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technical ideas that can be recognized as computational. In Go¨del’s proof of the
incompleteness theorem, Go¨del uses primitive recursive functions and arithmeti-
zation which are important tools in theoretic computer science. The technique
of arithmetization which represents syntactic elements, such as logical terms, for-
mulas, and proofs, as numbers, has been used crucially in theoretical computer
science (see [Papadimitriou, 2014]). Negative results constitute an important and
distinguishing tradition in theoretical computer science. One typical example of
negative results in theoretic computer science is the undecidability of the halting
problem (the problem of telling whether a given program will eventually terminate)
proved by Alan Turing. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is an ideal archetype and
Turing’s halting problem can be seen as a sharpening of Go¨del’s theorem. For
more discussions of the influence of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem on theoretic
computer science, we refer to [Baaz, Papadimitriou, Putnam, Scott and Harper,
2014].
4.2. Fruitfulness. In this section, we justify for the fruitfulness of Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorem from the following three aspects:
(A) Has “important” consequences;
(B) Has multiple “difficult” proofs;
(C) Leads to many new “important” theorems.
Now, we first examine “important” consequences of Go¨del’s incompleteness the-
orem. Go¨del’s theorem has at least the following “important” consequences:
(A) Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem answers a foundational question: is any true
sentence about arithmetic provable in the formal system of arithmetic (PA)?
It reveals the essential difference between Truth and Prov: Prov ( Truth
(i.e. there is a true sentence of arithmetic which is independent of PA);
(B) Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem shows certain weaknesses and the essential
limitation of one given formal system (or the limit of proof and computation);
(C) Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is a blow to Whitehead-Russell’s program for
proving that all mathematics (or at least quite a lot of it) could be derived
solely from logic in their three-volume Principia Mathematica;
(D) Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem has significant philosophical meaning and pro-
motes the philosophical investigation of the questions concerning the nature
of mind and machine, the difference between human intelligence and machine
intelligence, and the limit of machine intelligence.
(E) Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem shows that Hilbert’s program can not be fully
realized.
The first four aspects are well known. We only give some comments of aspect
(E). Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem directly refutes the first goal of Hilbert’s
program (i.e. finding a formal system in which we can formalize and prove all classic
mathematical theorems). One driving goal in Hilbert’s program was to justify
the implicit or explicit assumption of the “actual infinite” in mathematics by a
reduction to purely finitary concepts and reasonings. A proof-theoretic reduction
of a theory T to a theory S shows that, as far as a certain class of propositions
is concerned, if T proves a proposition, then S proves it too and the proof of this
fact is itself finitary (see [Feferman, 1988, p. 364]). Hilbert’s program can then be
seen as the search for a proof-theoretic reduction of all of mathematics to finitary
mathematics.20 However, G2 shows that any consistent theory powerful enough to
20See [Feferman, 1988] for a good survey of proof-theoretical results stemming from Hilbert’s
program which are closely tied to various reductive foundational aims: reducing the countable
infinite to the finitary; reducing the uncountable infinite to the countable infinite; reducing the
impredicative to the predicative and reducing the nonconstructive to the constructive.
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encode addition and multiplication of integers cannot prove its own consistency and
it is impossible to reduce all of infinitistic mathematics to finitistic mathematics: to
prove consistency of PA one needs stronger methods than those available in PA.
The failure of the second goal of Hilbert’s program due to G2 is apparent if all
finitary arguments can be formalized in PA.
Now, we examine the proofs of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and argue that
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem has multiple “difficult” proofs. Go¨del’s proof of his
incompleteness theorem has three original ideas: arithmetization, representability
and self-reference.21 We say a proof of G1 is constructive if it explicitly constructs
the independent sentence from the base theory algorithmically. We say that a
proof of G1 has the Rosser property if the proof only assumes that the base theory
is consistent instead of assuming that the base theory is ω-consistent or 1-consistent.
We say a proof uses the method from field X means that this proof uses (not “only”
uses) some knowledge from field X (a proof may use methods from varied fields).
Go¨del’s proof of G1 has the following features:
(1) uses the method from proof theory with arithmetization;
(2) the proof formalizes the liar paradox;
(3) the proof is constructive;22
(4) Go¨del’s proof does not have the Rosser property;
(5) Go¨del’s sentence is constructed via metamathematical method and has no real
mathematical content.23
All the above features of Go¨del’s proof of G1 are not the necessary condition to
prove G1. For example, we also have proofs of G1 that are non-constructive,24 have
the Rosser property and do not use arithmetization.
After Go¨del, people have found many technical proofs of Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorem via varied methods from different fields: some use the method from
proof theory, some use the method from recursion theory,25 some use the method
from model theory,26 some do not use arithmetization, some use the Diagonaliza-
tion Lemma,27 some use logical paradox,28 some are constructive, some have the
Rosser property, some use Kolmogorov complexity,29 and some construct indepen-
dent arithmetic sentences with real mathematical contents. These methods are not
21Before Go¨del, Emil Post independently discovered a statement undecidable within Principia
Mathematica whose truth could nevertheless be established by metamathematical considerations.
But he never published the result. See [Murawski, 1999, p. 203].
22I.e. given a consistent r.e. extension T of PA, one can effectively find a true Π01 sentence
GT of arithmetic such that GT is independent of T . Go¨del calls this the “incompletability or
inexhaustability of mathematics”.
23I.e. Go¨del’s sentence is a pure logical construction (via the arithmetization of syntax and
provability predicate) and has no relevance with classic mathematics (without any combinatorial
or number-theoretic content). On the contrary, Paris-Harrington Principle is an independent
arithmetic sentence from classic mathematics with combinatorial content.
24A non-constructive proof of G1 proves the mere existence of the independent sentence and
does not show its existence algorithmically.
25For example, Kleene gave a simple proof of G1 via recursion theory (see [Salehi and Seraji,
2018, Theorem 2.2]).
26Arithmetic completeness theorem ([Lindstro¨m, 1997]) is an important tool in the model-
theoretic proof of the incompleteness theorem.
27Let T be a consistent r.e. extension of Q. The Diagonalization Lemma says that for any
formula φ(x) with exactly one free variable, there exists sentence θ such that T ⊢ θ ↔ φ(pθq).
28Many paradoxes have been used to give new proofs of incompleteness theorems: e.g. the Liar
Paradox, Berry’s Paradox, Grelling-Nelson’s Paradox and Yablo’s Paradox.
29Kolmogorov complexity is a measure of the quantity of information in finite objects. Chaitin
[1974] gave information-theoretic formulation of G1 and proved a weaker version of G1 in terms
of Kolmogorov complexity. Kikuchi [1997] proved the formalized version of G1 via Kolmogorov
complexity.
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exclusive: a proof of G1 or G2 may use several methods. We have examples of
proofs of G1 with the above methods and examples of proofs without the above
methods in the literature. For example, nearly all proofs of G1 use arithmetization;
however, A. Grzegorczyk proposed theory TC in [Grzegorczyk, 2005] as a possi-
ble alternative theory for studying incompleteness and undecidability and proved
that TC is incomplete without the use of arithmetization. This phenomenon also
applies to the above other methods.30
Note that G1 refers to the existence of an arithmetic sentence independent of
the base system. After Go¨del, people have found many independent arithmetic
sentences with real mathematical contents. All these concrete independent arith-
metic sentences from mathematics we know are provable in fragments of second
order arithmetic and are more complex than Go¨del’s sentence: Go¨del’s sentence is
equivalent to Con(PA) in PA; but all these arithmetic sentences from mathemat-
ics are not only independent of PA but also independent of PA +Con(PA) (see
[Beklemishev, 2010, p. 36] and [Murawski, 1999, p. 301]).
In summary, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem has many “difficult” proofs using
distinct techniques from varied fields. These different proofs share features that
make manifest connections among different areas of mathematics.
Now, we justify that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem leads to many new “im-
portant” theorems from the following two aspects: generalizations of the theorem
(the way the theorem can be generalized or extended) and the boundary (or the
limit) of the theorem (i.e. under what conditions the theorem holds and under what
conditions the theorem fails). For us, these two aspects have greatly deepen our
understanding of the scope and limit of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. We make
no attempt at completeness here. There are many more new theorems related to
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem in the literature than we can cover here.
After Go¨del, his incompleteness theorem has a great variety of “important”
generalizations. From the current research practice on incompleteness, G1 can be
generalized to both extensions of PA and subsystems of PA. Before we give some
typical examples to explain this, we first review some notions we will use.
We say a theory T is Σ0n-definable if there is a Σ
0
n formula α(x) such that n is
the Go¨del number of some sentence of T if and only if N |= α(n); a theory T is
Σ0n-sound if for all Σ
0
n sentences φ, T ⊢ φ implies N |= φ; a theory T is Π
0
n-decisive
if for all Π0
n
sentences φ, either T ⊢ φ or T ⊢ ¬φ holds.
Firstly, Rosser proved G1 only assuming that the base theory is consistent:
Rosser constructed the Rosser sentence (a Π01 sentence) and showed that if T is
a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of Q, then the Rosser sentence is
independent of T . Go¨del’s proof of G1 assumes that T is ω-consistent. Note that
ω-consistency implies consistency. But the converse does not hold and the notion
of ω-consistency is stronger than consistency since we can find examples of theo-
ries that are consistent but not ω-consistent.31 Secondly, G1 can be generalized to
some arithmetically definable theories: for example, Kikuchi-Kurahashi and Salehi-
Seraji show that if T is a Σ0
n+1-definable and Σ
0
n
-sound extension of Q, then T is
not Π0
n+1-decisive.
32
The notion of interpretation provides us with a method to measure and compare
the strength of different theories in different languages. Informally, an interpreta-
tion of a theory T in a theory S is a mapping from formulas of T to formulas of
30The theory TC is a weak theory mutually interpretable with Q and hence interpretable in
PA.
31For example, assuming PA is consistent, then PA + ¬Con(PA) is consistent, but not ω-
consistent.
32See [Kikuchi and Kurahashi, 2017, Theorem 4.8], [Salehi and Seraji, 2017, Theorem 2.5].
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S that maps all axioms of T to sentences provable in S. For the precise definition
of interpretation, we refer to [Visser, 2011] for more details. In this paper, we say
that T is weaker than S w.r.t. interpretation if T is interpretable in S but S is not
interpretable in T .
Thirdly, G1 can be generalized via the notion of interpretation. We define that
G1 holds for a theory T iff for any recursively axiomatizable consistent theory S, if
T is interpretable in S, then S is incomplete ([Cheng, 2019b]). In fact, G1 not only
holds for r.e. extensions of PA, but also holds for many weak subsystems of PA.
Definition 4.1. The signature of theory R consists of 0, S,+,× and predicate ≤.
We denote as n the term
n
︷ ︸︸ ︷
S · · ·S(0).
Axioms of R:
(1) m+ n = m+ n;
(2) m× n = m× n;
(3) m 6= n if m 6= n;
(4) ∀x(x ≤ n→ x = 0 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n);
(5) ∀x(x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x).
It is well known that G1 holds for Q, as well as for R (see [Vaught, 1962]). For
more examples of weak theories of PA for which G1 holds, we refer to [Cheng,
2019b] for more discussions.
Now, we discuss generalizations of G2. Let T be a recursively axiomatizable
consistent extension of Q. Recall that Con(T ) is the canonical arithmetic sentence
expressing the consistency of T . G2 can also be generalized in different ways.
Here, we only give two typical examples we think important. Firstly, G2 can be
generalized via the notion of interpretation: there is no r.e. theory T such that
Q +Con(T ) is interpretable in T , i.e. Q +Con(T ) is not interpretable in T (see
[Visser, 2011]). As a corollary, G2 holds for any consistent r.e. theory interpreting
Q. Secondly, Lo¨b’s theorem is an important generalization of G2. Lo¨b showed
that if a provability predicate PrT (x) is standard, then for any formula φ, if T ⊢
PrT (φ)→ φ, then T ⊢ φ. As a corollary, we have T 0 Con(T ).
We have shown that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem can be generalized in dif-
ferent ways. These generalizations show the applicability and explanatory power of
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, reveal that the incompleteness phenomenon pre-
vails in both some extensions of PA and some sub-systems of PA, and indicate that
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is fruitful to lead to new “important” theorems.
Since fruitfulness is one of our criteria of mathematical depth, these generalizations
give us mathematical evidences of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
Now, we turn to the second aspect of the way Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
leads to many new “important” theorems: the boundary (or the limit) of the theo-
rem. We first give a brief account of the boundary of G1. There are many consistent
formal theories which are complete.33 Whether a theory about arithmetic is com-
plete depends on the language of the theory. The theory PA is incomplete in the
language L(0,S,+,×). There are respectively recursively axiomatized complete
arithmetic theories in the language of L(0,S), L(0,S, <) and L(0,S, <,+) (see
Section 3.1-3.2 in [Enderton, 2001]). Containing enough information of arithmetic
(e.g. the arithmetic of multiplication) is essential for the proof of G1: that is if
the theory contains only the information about the arithmetic of addition without
33For example, the theory of dense linear orderings without endpoints (DLO), the theory of
ordered divisible groups (ODG), the theory of algebraically closed fields of given characteristic
(ACFp), and the theory of real closed fields (RCF), etc (see [Epstein, 2011] for details of these
theories). The Euclidean geometry is not about arithmetic but only about points, circles and lines
in general; but the Euclidean geometry is complete as Tarski has proved.
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multiplication, then it could be complete.34 However, containing the arithmetic of
multiplication is not a sufficient condition for a theory to be incomplete.35
Recall that G1 holds for some arithmetic definable extensions of Q, but it is
not true that any arithmetic definable extension of Q is incomplete.36 It was often
thought that R is the weakest theory w.r.t. interpretation for which G1 holds. In
fact, we can find many theories S such that G1 holds for S and S is weaker than
R w.r.t. interpretation.37
Now, we give a brief account of the boundary (or the limit) of Go¨del’s sec-
ond incompleteness theorem. The intensionality of Go¨del sentence and the consis-
tency sentence has been widely discussed in the literature (e.g. [Halbach and Visser,
2014a], [Halbach and Visser, 2014a], [Visser, 2011]). In the following, we give a brief
overview of the intensionality of G2 (we refer to [Cheng, 2019c] for more details).
Both mathematically and philosophically, G2 is more problematic than G1. The
difference between G1 and G2 is that, in the case of G1, we are mainly interested in
the fact that it shows that some sentence is undecidable if PA is ω-consistent. We
make no claim to the effect that that sentence “really” expresses what we would
express by saying “PA cannot prove this sentence”. But in the case of G2, we are
also interested in the content of the statement.
For a consistent theory T , we say that G2 holds for T if the consistency statement
of T is not provable in T . However, this definition is vague, and whether G2 holds
for T depends on how we formulate the consistency statement. We refer to this
phenomenon as the intensionality of G2. The status of G2 is essentially different
from G1 due to the intensionality of G2. We can say that G1 is extensional in
the sense that we can construct a concrete independent mathematical statement
without referring to arithmetization and provability predicate. However, G2 is
intensional and “whether G2 holds for T ” depends on varied factors as we will
discuss.
In this section, unless stated otherwise, we make the following assumptions:
(1) The theory T is a consistent r.e. extension of Q;
(2) the canonical arithmetic formula to express the consistency of the base theory
T is Con(T ) , ¬PrT (0 6= 0);
(3) The canonical numbering we use is Go¨del’s numbering;
(4) The provability predicate we use is standard;
(5) The formula representing the set of axioms is Σ01.
Based on the current research practice, we argue that “whether G2 holds for T ”
depends on the following factors:
(1) the choice of the base theory T ;
(2) the choice of the method to express consistency;
(3) the choice of a provability predicate;
(4) the choice of a numbering;
(5) the choice of a specific formula numerating the axiom set of T .
These factors are not independent, and a choice made at an earlier stage may
have effects on the choices made at a later stage. In the following, when we discuss
34For example, Presburger arithmetic is the theory of arithmetic of addition, and its lan-
guage only contains non-logical symbols 0,S and +; but Presburger arithmetic is complete (see
[Murawski, 1999, Theorem 3.2.2]).
35For example, there exists a complete recursively axiomatized theory in the language of
L(0,×) (see [Murawski, 1999, p. 230]).
36For example, there exists a Σ0n+1-definable, Σ
0
n−1-sound (n ≥ 1) theory that is a complete
extension of Q (see [Salehi and Seraji, 2017, Theorem 2.6]).
37For example, Cheng [2019b] shows that for any recursively inseparable pair 〈A,B〉, there is
a theory U〈A,B〉 such that G1 holds for U〈A,B〉 and U〈A,B〉 is weaker than R w.r.t. interpretation.
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how G2 depends on one factor, we always assume that other factors are fixed as in
the above default assumptions and only the factor we are discussing is varied. For
example, Visser [2011] rests on fixed choices for (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) but varies the
choice of (3); Grabmayr [2019] rests on fixed choices for (1) and (3)-(5) but varies
the choice of (2); Feferman [1960] rests on fixed choices for (1)-(4) but varies the
choice of (5). In the following, we give a brief discussion of how G2 depends on the
above five factors. For more discussions of these factors, we refer to [Cheng, 2019c].
Firstly, “Whether G2 holds for the base theory” depends on the choice of the
base theory. A foundational question about G2 is: how much of information about
arithmetic is required for the proof of G2. If the base theory does not contain
enough information of arithmetic, then G2 may fail in the sense that the consistency
statement is provable in the base theory.38
Secondly, “Whether G2 holds for T ” depends on the choice of the method to
express consistency. From the philosophical point of view, one can ask: what a
consistency statement of a theory is? when can we reasonably say that the arith-
metic sentence Con(T ) does really express the consistency of T ? (see [Visser,
2011, p. 545]). These questions are difficult to answer and have been investigated
by many logicians, among them Resnik [1974], Detlefsen [1980], Visser [2016, 2011],
Feferman [1960], Auerbach [1985] and Franks [2009]. In the literature, we usually
use an arithmetic formula in the language of T to express the consistency of T .
Artemov [2019] argues that in Hilbert’s consistency program, the original formula-
tion of consistency “no sequence of formulas is a derivation of a contradiction” is
about finite sequences of formulas, not about arithmetization, proof codes, and in-
ternalized quantifiers. Artemov concludes that G2 does not actually exclude finitary
consistency proofs of the original formulation of consistency. Artemov shows that
the original formulation of consistency admits a direct proof in informal arithmetic
and this proof is formalizable in PA (see [Artemov, 2019]).39
In the following, we use a single arithmetic sentence to express the consistency
statement. Even among consistency statements defined via a single arithmetic sen-
tence, we still have different ways to express the consistency of T . For example,
another way to express the consistency of T is Con0(T ) , ∀x(Fml(x)∧PrT (x)→
¬PrT (¬˙x)).
40 Kurahashi [2019] constructed a Rosser provability predicate such
that G2 holds for the consistency statement formulated via Con0(T ) (i.e. the con-
sistency statement formulated via Con0(T ) and Rosser provability predicate is not
provable in T ), but G2 fails for the consistency statement formulated via Con(T )
(i.e. the consistency statement formulated via Con(T ) and Rosser provability pred-
icate is provable in T ).
Thirdly, “whether G2 holds for a theory T ” depends on the choice of the prov-
ability predicate. Visser [2016] argued that, being a consistency statement is not an
absolute concept but a role w.r.t. a choice of the provability predicate (see [Visser,
2016]). Recall that G2 holds for standard provability predicates.41 However, G2may
fail for non-standard provability predicates. One important non-standard provabil-
ity predicate is Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) introduced by Rosser [1936] to
38Willard [2006] explored the generality and boundary-case exceptions of G2 under some
base theories. Willard constructed examples of recursively enumerable arithmetical theories that
couldn’t prove the totality of successor function but could prove their own canonical consistency
(see [Willard, 2001], [Willard, 2006]).
39Informal arithmetic is the theory of informal elementary number theory containing recursive
identities of addition and multiplication as well as the induction principle. The formal arithmetic
PA is just the conventional formalization of the informal arithmetic (see [Artemov, 2019]).
40Fml(x) is the formula which represents the relation that x is a code of a formula.
41If provability predicate PrT (x) is standard, then T 0 ¬PrT (p0 6= 0q).
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improve Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem.42 Define the consistency statement
ConR(T ) via Rosser provability predicate as ¬PrR
T
(p0 6= 0q). Then G2 fails for
Rosser provability predicate in the sense that T ⊢ ConR(T ).
Fourthly, “Whether G2 holds for T ” depends on the choice of numberings. Any
injective function γ from a set of L(PA)-expressions to ω qualifies as a numbering.
Go¨del’s numbering is a special kind of numberings under which the Go¨del number
of the set of axioms of PA is recursive. Grabmayr [2019] showed that G2 holds for
acceptable numberings. But G2 fails for some non-acceptable numberings.43
Finally, “Whether G2 holds for T ” depends on the numeration of T . We say
that a formula α(x) is a numeration of T if for any n, we have PA ⊢ α(n) iff n
is the Go¨del number of some φ ∈ T . As a generalization, G2 holds for any Σ01
numeration of T .44 However, G2 fails for some Π01 numerations of T . For example,
Feferman [1960] constructed a Π01 numeration τ(u) of T such that G2 fails under
this numeration.45
The research on the boundary of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem reveals the
limit of the applicability of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, greatly deepens our
understanding of the scope of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, and contributes
to new mathematical evidences showing that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is
fruitful to lead to new important theorems.
4.3. Unity. In this section, we justify for the unity of Go¨del’s incompleteness the-
orem, and show that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem ties together apparently dis-
parate fields and draws interconnections between these fields. In the following,
we give a brief account of the unity of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem from the
following aspects:
(1) finding the order in chaos between mathematics and meta-mathematics;
(2) the close relationship with the theory of undecidability;
(3) the close relationship with logical paradox;
(4) the close relationship with provability logic;
(5) the close relationship with the formal theory of truth.
Go¨del’s proof of the incompleteness theorem uses methods from both mathe-
matics and logic. For example, in Go¨del’s proof, he used the Chinese Remainder
Theorem and the unique factorization in number theory, as well as some meta-
mathematical methods in logic such as arithmetization, representability, and self-
reference construction. In Section 4.1, we give some examples of natural inde-
pendent sentences with real mathematical contents.46 Section 4.1 emphasizes the
difference between meta-mathematical independent sentences constructed via pure
logic and concrete independent sentences with real mathematical contents. An
interesting and amazing fact is that all the mathematically natural independent
sentences with combinatorial or number-theoretic content we list in Section 4.1
42The Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) is defined as the formula ∃y(PrfT (x, y) ∧ ∀z ≤
y¬PrfT (¬˙(x), z)), where ¬˙ is a function symbol expressing a primitive recursive function calcu-
lating the code of ¬φ from the code of φ.
43For the definition of acceptable numberings, we refer to [Grabmayr, 2019].
44Given a formula α(x) in L(T ), define the formula Prfα(x, y) saying “y is the Go¨del number
of a proof of the formula with Go¨del number x from the set of all sentences satisfying α(x)”;
define the provability predicate Prα(x) of α(x) as ∃yPrfα(x, y) and the consistency statement
Conα(T ) as ¬Prα(p0 6= 0q). This generalization says that if α(x) is a Σ01 numeration of T , then
T 0 Conα(T ).
45I.e. T ⊢ Conτ (T ).
46For example, the Paris-Harrington Principle, the Kanamori-McAloon principle, the Kirby-
Paris sentence, the Hercules-Hydra game, the Worm principle, the flipping principle, the arboreal
statement, the P.Pudla´k’s Principle, the kiralic and regal principles.
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are in fact provably equivalent in PA to a certain meta-mathematical sentence.47
Isaacson [1987] argues that this result reveals something of the implicit (hidden)
higher-order content of the mathematically natural independent sentences we list
in Section 4.1. This phenomenon shows that the difference between mathematical
and meta-mathematical statements is not as huge as we might have expected (see
[Dean, 2015] for more discussions of this claim).
In the rest of this section, we give a brief account of the close relationship among
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, the theory of undecidability, logical paradox, prov-
ability logic and the formal theory of truth.
Go¨del’s work has many crucial connections to the theory of computation and
undecidability. Go¨del’s proof contains the germs of such influential computational
ideas as arithmetization and primitive recursion. The method of arithmetization
plays a major role in the growth of recursion theory. We say a theory T is essen-
tially undecidable if any recursively axiomatizable consistent extension of T in the
same language is undecidable; and T is essentially incomplete if all recursively ax-
iomatizable consistent extensions of T are incomplete. Since theory T is essentially
undecidable if and only if T is essentially incomplete,48 the theory of complete-
ness/incompleteness is closely related to the theory of decidability/undecidability.
Recall that we have defined the notion “G1 holds for theory T ”. From [Cheng,
2019b], G1 holds for T if and only if T is essentially undecidable. It is well known
that we can proved G1 and G2 in terms of the undecidability of the halting problem.
All of these show the close relationship between the theory of incompleteness and
the theory of undecidability.
The current research practice on Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem reveals that
G1 is closely related to logical paradox. Go¨del commented in his famous paper
that “any epistemological antinomy could be used for a similar proof of the exis-
tence of undecidable propositions” (see [Feferman, 1995a]). In Go¨del’s proof of G1,
we can view Go¨del’s sentence as the formalization of the Liar Paradox. Go¨del’s
sentence concerns the notion of provability but the liar sentence in the Liar Para-
dox concerns the notion of truth in the standard model of arithmetic. Except for
the Liar Paradox, many other paradoxes have been properly formalized to give
new proofs of incompleteness theorems: for example, Berry’s Paradox in [Boolos,
1989][Chaitin, 1974][Kikuchi, 1994] [Kikuchi, Kurahashi and Sakai, 2012] [Kikuchi
and Tanaka, 1994][Vopenka, 1966]; Grelling-Nelson’s Paradox in [Cies´lin´ski, 2002];
the Unexpected Examination Paradox in [Fitch, 1964] [Kritchman and Raz, 2010],
and Yablo’s Paradox in [Cies´lin´ski and Urbaniak, 2013] [Kurahashi, 2014][Kura-
hashi, 2014][Priest, 1997]. Dean [2019] gives a detailed discussion on how to use
the arithmetized completeness theorem to give formal incompleteness results from
set theoretic and semantic paradoxes.
One important consequence of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is Tarski’s unde-
finability theorem of truth as an application of the Diagonalization Lemma. From
Tarski’s theorem, Truth is not definable in N (the standard model of arithmetic);
47Consider the following reflection principle for Σ01 sentences: for any Σ
0
1 sentence φ in L(PA),
if φ is provable in PA, then φ is true. Using the arithmetization of syntax, one can write this
principle as a sentence of L(PA) and denote it by Rfn
Σ0
1
(PA) (see [Murawski, 1999, p.301]).
McAloon has shown in PA that the Paris-Harrington Principle is equivalent to Rfn
Σ0
1
(PA) (see
[Murawski, 1999, p. 301]). In fact, similar equivalences can be established for all the natural
independent sentences with combinatorial or number-theoretic content we list in Section 4.1 (see
[Beklemishev, 2010, p. 36], [Beklemishev, 2003, p. 3] and [Murawski, 1999, p. 301]).
48This follows from the following two facts: (1) every consistent recursively axiomatizable
complete theory is decidable; (2) every incomplete decidable theory has a consistent, decidable
complete extension in the same language (see [Murawski, 1999, p. 214-215]).
ON THE DEPTH OF GO¨DEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM 25
as a corollary, Truth is not arithmetic and not representable in PA.49 But Prov
is definable in N and recursive enumerable, even if it is not recursive (for details of
the properties of Truth and Prov, we refer to [Murawski, 1999] [Tarski, Mostowski
and Robinson, 1953]). Current research practice reveals the relationship between
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and Tarski’s undefinability theorem of truth. For
example, Visser [2019] gives a self-reference-free proof of Go¨del’s second incom-
pleteness theorem from Tarski’s undefinability theorem of truth.50
Provability logic is an important tool for the study of incompleteness and meta-
mathematics of arithmetic. The origins of provability logic (e.g. Henkin’s problem,
the isolation of derivability conditions, Lo¨b’s theorem) are all closely tied to the
incompleteness theorem historically. In this sense, we can say that Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorem plays a unifying role between first order arithmetic and modal
logic. The notion of arithmetical interpretation provides us with an important tool
to establish the relationship between provability logic and meta-mathematics of
arithmetic.51 Surprisingly, Solovay’s Arithmetical Completeness Theorems for GL
and GLS52 characterize the difference between Prov and Truth via provability
logic.53
Provability logic is the logic of properties of provability predicates. Note that
the proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem depends on the property of provability
predicates. Provability logic provides us with a new perspective and an important
tool to understand incompleteness. Provability logics based on different provability
predicates reveal the intensionability of provability predicates which is one source
of the intensionability of G2, and provide us with a new route to examine the
intensionability of provability predicates. Under different numerations of T , the
provability predicate may have different properties, and hence may correspond to
different provability logics (i.e. different modal principles under arithmetic inter-
pretations). For more discussions about the relationship between incompleteness
and provability predicate, we refer to [Kurahashi, 2019a] [Kurahashi, 2019b].
4.4. Some explanations of our account of the depth of Go¨del’s theorem.
In this section, we give some explanations of our account of the depth of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem.
Deep theorems are generally the work of several generations of mathematicians.
For example, for the influence, fruitfulness and unity of Go¨del’s incompleteness the-
orem, Go¨del may not even realize that his theorem is so influential on foundations
of mathematics, philosophy, mathematics and theoretic computer science, has so
many “difficult” proofs and generalizations, establishes so many connections among
49We say a relation is arithmetic if it is Σ0n for some n. We say a relation R(x) is representable
in PA if there is a formula φ(x) such that PA ⊢ φ(m) when R(m) holds, and PA ⊢ ¬φ(m) when
R(m) does not hold.
50However, it is a big open question whether there is a totally self-reference-free proof of Go¨del’s
second incompleteness theorem. We can prove G2 via Yablo’s paradox, but it is controversial
whether Yablo’s paradox is totally self-reference-free.
51Let T be a consistent r.e. extension of Q. A mapping from the set of all modal propositional
variables to the set of L(T )-sentences is called an arithmetical interpretation. Every arithmetical
interpretation f is uniquely extended to the mapping f∗ from the set of all modal formulas to
the set of L(T )-sentences so that f∗ satisfies the following conditions: (1) f∗(p) = f(p) for each
propositional variable p; (2) f∗ commutes with every propositional connective; (3) f∗(✷A) is
PrT (pf
∗(A)q) for every modal formula A. In the following, we equate arithmetical interpretation
f with its unique extension f∗ defined on the set of all modal formulas.
52The definition of GL and GLS is standard, and we refer to [Boolos, 1993].
53Solovay’s Arithmetical Completeness Theorem for GL says that if T is a Σ01-sound r.e. ex-
tension of Q, then for any modal formula φ in L(GL), GL ⊢ φ iff T ⊢ φf for every arithmetic
interpretation f . Solovay’s Arithmetical Completeness Theorem for GLS says that for any modal
formula φ, GLS ⊢ φ iff N |= φf for every arithmetic interpretation f .
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varied fields, and the status of G2 depends on so many factors. People will find
more mathematical evidences of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem in the
future research on incompleteness. For example, people may find more evidences of
its impact on varied fields, more distinct proofs, and more evidences of leading to
new “important” theorems and establishing close relationship among varied fields.
A natural question is: are there salient differences between the depth of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem and the depth of a pure mathematical theorem such as
Szemere´di’s Theorem? Our account of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theo-
rem also provides us with a route to approach this question. The general criteria
of mathematical depth are expected to apply to all mathematical theorems consid-
ered as deep. The difference of the account of the depth of distinct mathematical
theorems lies in the difference among the justifications of these general criteria for
distinct theorems. Based on Arana’s work in [2015], we can argue that Szemere´di’s
Theorem also satisfies our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria.54 Thus, according
to our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria, both Szemere´di’s Theorem and Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem are deep. However, even if our general criteria apply to
both Szemere´di’s Theorem and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, they have different
justifications for their influence, fruitfulness and unity. For example, even if both
Szemere´di’s Theorem and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem have impact on differ-
ent fields, their influence cover different fields. The impact of Szemere´di’s Theorem
is more on pure mathematics and especially number theory. But the impact of
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is more on logic. In summary, both Szemere´di’s
Theorem and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem satisfy our Influence-Fruitfulness-
Unity criteria, but they have different justifications for the three criteria. The
difference among their justifications reflects the difference between the depth of
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and the depth of Szemere´di’s Theorem.
Another natural question is: is depth an objective property (independent of our
interests and abilities) or a subjective property of the theorem (something essen-
tially tied to our interests, abilities, and so on)? It is not our goal to decide on
the larger question of whether depth is objective and what objectivity would con-
sist in. However, it is an interesting question whether our accounts of the depth
of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem are objective (and if so, in what sense), and
whether they can deliver a notion of depth that is not vague and not essentially
dependent on our contingent interests and abilities. For us, this depends on how
we view the objectivity of an account of mathematical depth. Assuming we view
an account of mathematical depth as objective if our justifications are based on
mathematical evidences of the theorem, then our accounts of the depth of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem are objective since our accounts are all based on math-
ematical evidences from the research practice of Go¨del’s theorem, not based on
our personal preferences or interests of Go¨del’s theorem (even if we have limited
knowledge about the current research of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and the
mathematical evidences we have presented here are limited). Assuming we view
an account of mathematical depth as subjective if our justifications depend on the
status of the current research practice, then our accounts of Influence-Fruitfulness-
Unity of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem are subjective. The key point is that
influence, fruitfulness and unity of a theorem all depend on the level of research
practice of this theorem. But there is no limit of research practice, and as research
practice goes on, people may find more and more evidences of the influence, fruit-
fulness and unity of this theorem. A theorem may not be influential or fruitful or
exhibiting unity in our sense immediately after its publication, but it may become
54This is an observation based on Arana’s work in [2015]. Due to the space limit, we can not
provide the detailed argument for this claim.
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more and more influential, have more distinct proofs, lead to more “important” re-
sults and establish more unity during the ongoing research practice. Assuming we
view an account of mathematical depth as objective if the account does not depend
on personal preferences, interests and abilities, then at least our account of the
influence of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is interest-dependent and not objec-
tive. For mathematicians interested in foundations of mathematics, they may view
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem as influential; but for mathematicians without any
interest on foundations of mathematics, they may not view Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem as influential.
The depth of a mathematical theorem is not a fact about the theorem but an eval-
uation of this theorem from the specific academic community. From the personal
evaluation, definitely, the depth of a mathematical theorem is person-dependent:
for the same theorem, some may think it as interesting and deep, but others may
not. But we may have an objective account of mathematical depth from the proper
academic community. For example, the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
should not be judged by the academic community from topology; instead, it should
be judged by the academic community from mathematical logic. We can describe
a possible practical procedure of judging whether a given mathematical theorem
is deep. Given a mathematical theorem A in some field X , whether theorem A is
deep can be judged by a group of academic committees which consist of the best
scholars in the field X . Following the commonly accepted criteria of mathematical
depth by this group (such as our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria), this group of
academic committees can rank the depth of theorem A according to the commonly
accepted criteria. Recall that our notions of influence, fruitfulness and unity come
in degrees. This provides us with a potential route to compare the depth of distinct
mathematical theorems from the same field.
Now, we return to our original question: is Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem deep?
The answer depends on our view of mathematical depth. In this paper, we show that
if adopting our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria, then Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem is deep and we give an account of its depth by showing that it satisfies the
Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria. If we think of mathematical depth differently,
we may not view Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem as deep. Nowadays, Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem and his proof are the standard materials in logic textbooks
for advanced undergraduates, and the current research on incompleteness is more
technical and difficult than Go¨del’s original proof. Thus, if we think that the
depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is only linked to the original proof by
Go¨del and its logical consequences, and is not related to the research practice on
incompleteness after Go¨del, then we may no longer view Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem as deep since the later research practice on incompleteness has greatly
deepen our understanding of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
Finally, we give a general comment on the differences among the depth of math-
ematical proofs, the depth of mathematical theorems and the depth of research
practice. In this paper, our general criteria of mathematical depth include the
criteria of mathematical proofs and research practice. In fact, they have different
focuses for their criteria of depth. We can explain the differences metaphorically as
follows: the evaluation of the depth of mathematical proofs is like patent review,
the evaluation of the depth of mathematical theorems is like paper review, and
the evaluation of the depth of research practice is like project review. Just like
the focuses of the criteria of reviewing a patent, reviewing a paper and reviewing
a project are different, the focuses of the criteria of the depth of mathematical
proofs, mathematical theorems and research practice are also distinct. We leave
more explorations of these differences for the future research.
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In summary, in this paper, to answer the question “is Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem deep, and if yes, in what sense?”, we propose three general criteria (influ-
ence, fruitfulness, unity) of mathematical depth. Then we account for the depth
of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem based on the current research practice by justi-
fying that it satisfies our Influence-Fruitfulness-Unity criteria. We also give some
explanations of our account of the depth of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and
discuss some possible objections to our account. We hope our account of the depth
of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem shed a little light on mathematical depth as a
notion with many faces.
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